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INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment commands that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”1  The Framers intended for the Establishment Clause to erect a wall 
separating the relations of church and state.2  This metaphor is an accepted 
conceptualization of the relationship between church and state that 
represents the notion that the state neither inhibit nor advance any religion.3  
Thomas Jefferson’s architectural symbolism illustrating the meaning of the 
                                                          
 1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2. See DANIEL DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION 
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 1-2 (2002) (recounting Thomas Jefferson’s celebration of 
the division of religion and civil government in a letter to Danbury Baptist Association 
of Connecticut on January 1, 1802). 
 3. See id. at 2 (conveying that religion is a voluntary and intimately personal 
endeavor; political intrusions would implicate an individual’s rights of conscience). 
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First Amendment sparked debate about its implications for church-state law.4  
Despite a declaration forbidding the establishment of religion in the 
Constitution, there are many religious references throughout American 
government including: “One Nation Under God” in the pledge of allegiance 
and “In God We Trust” on U.S. currency.5  Many of these traditions are now 
widely accepted as part of American culture; however, some traditions, such 
as government sanctioned prayer, face repeated challenges in the Court as 
potential violations of the First Amendment.6 
This Comment examines the constitutionality of state legislator-led prayer 
by focusing on a circuit split between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits regarding 
prayers at local government board meetings led directly by elected 
commissioners.7  Part I describes the current Supreme Court jurisprudence 
surrounding legislative prayer, specifically by exploring Marsh v. Chambers 
and Town of Greece v. Galloway.8  Part I also introduces the circuit court 
cases that analyze the constitutionality of prayer practices at local Board of 
Commissioner meetings.9  Part II compares the cases at issue in the current 
circuit split: Fourth Circuit case Lund v. Rowan County and Sixth Circuit 
case Bormuth v. County of Jackson.10  Part II argues that both the Fourth 
                                                          
 4. See id. at 2-4 (discussing the reliance on Jefferson’s metaphor in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, specifically Justice Black’s reference in the Everson v. Board of 
Education opinion). 
 5. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 442 (1962) (identifying that as a nation, we 
are a religious people and our institutions presuppose a higher being). 
 6. See generally Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (ruling 
that a school district’s policy permitting students to lead prayers before a football game 
was a violation of the Constitution); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992) (holding 
clerical members presiding over invocation and benediction at a public school graduation 
was inconsistent with the Establishment Clause); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-
795 (1983) (upholding the traditional practice of legislative prayer led by a paid clergy 
member); Engel, 370 U.S. at 424 (holding the prayer practices of the Board of Education 
violate the Establishment Clause despite parents’ ability to opt-out). 
 7. See Patrick L. Gregory, Circuit Split on Legislator-Led Prayer Could Entice 
Supreme Court, BNA (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.bna.com/circuit-split-legislatorled-
n57982087849/ (indicating that such a rigid split between circuit courts could prompt the 
Supreme Court to take up the issue of legislative prayer for the third time). 
 8. See infra Part I (demonstrating how the Court handles claims challenging 
legislative prayer, and the Court’s clarification in Town of Greece v. Galloway that 
legislative prayer was not a mere carved out exception to Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence). 
 9. See infra Part I (summarizing the decisions filed in Lund v. Rowan County and 
Bormuth v. County of Jackson). 
 10. See infra Part II (demonstrating the differences in how each circuit analyzed the 
prayer practices performed at local board meetings). 
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Circuit and Sixth Circuit correctly applied precedent despite reaching 
different verdicts as to the constitutionality of legislator-led prayer.11  
Finally, Part II proposes that if the Sixth Circuit considered additional 
evidence offered to supplement the record, the court would find the prayer 
practices in Jackson County, Michigan, violate the Constitution.12  Part III 
recommends that the Supreme Court take up the issue to answer looming 
questions regarding the constitutionality of legislator-led prayer and 
establish a framework for analysis to be followed by lower courts.13  Part IV 
concludes by reiterating the unique significance of legislative prayer in 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence and the implications of such precedent 
in the current circuit split.14 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. The First Amendment 
The First Amendment contains two clauses regarding religion: the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.15  These clauses were 
made applicable to states through incorporation by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.16  The Establishment Clause has been interpreted by the Court 
to mean that the government may not hold one religion or the absence of 
religion to be greater than any other religion.17  The Court has created various 
                                                          
 11. See infra Part II (distinguishing the factual records in each case and noting the 
fact-sensitive considerations a court must make in determining the constitutionality of 
particular legislative prayer practices). 
 12. See infra Part II (exploring the outcome of Bormuth if the Sixth Circuit had 
considered videos of commissioner’s treatment of the plaintiff and additional facts 
provided by the amicus brief filed by Americans United for the Separation of Church 
and State). 
 13. See infra Part III (explain that District Courts around the nation have also issued 
conflicting rulings on the topic of legislative prayer due to a lack of guidance from the 
Court). 
 14. See infra Part IV (concluding that courts should examine claims challenging the 
constitutionality of legislative led prayer on a case-by-case basis due to the fact-sensitive 
nature of the Court’s method of analysis). 
 15. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating Congress shall not make laws regarding the 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise of religion). 
 16. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1947) (noting that prior to the 
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, First Amendment restraints did not apply to states 
but many state constitutions still adopted similar provisions protecting religious 
liberties). 
 17. See id. at 15-16 (identifying that neither state nor federal government may set up 
a religious worship center, force or influence citizens to practice a religion, or levy taxes 
to benefit a religious group). 
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tests to evaluate Establishment Clause claims; the most commonly applied 
test is the Lemon Test which requires the government’s practice (1) to have 
a secular legislative purpose, (2) its principal and primary effect must neither 
advance nor inhibit religion, and (3) it must not nurture an unnecessary 
entanglement with religion.18  Challenges to legislative prayer practices are 
Establishment Clause inquiries; however, the Court has not analyzed these 
claims using the tests because the Court rested its holding on historical 
analysis.19 
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence of Legislative Prayer 
1. Marsh v. Chambers and the Historic Importance of Legislative Prayer 
The Supreme Court first answered challenges brought against the 
constitutionality of legislative prayer in the 1983 case, Marsh v. Chambers.20  
Ernest Chambers, a member of the Nebraska Legislature from the Eleventh 
District, brought suit to enjoin the legislature’s prayer practice led by a 
chaplain paid by the state.21  The majority opinion upheld the prayer practices 
of the Nebraska legislature based largely on the support of history and 
tradition.22  The Court asserted that legislative prayer does not conflict with 
the Establishment Clause based on the prayer policies adopted by the First 
Congress which allowed for a chaplain to be chosen and paid by the 
government, just as the case in the Nebraska Legislature.23  While historical 
patterns alone would not permit a modern constitutional violation, the 
majority of the Court believed the historical context surrounding legislative 
prayer revealed that the Framers did not intend to prohibit legislative 
                                                          
 18. See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (holding statutes 
that provide state aid to church-related educational institutions are unconstitutional). 
 19. See Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 515 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(noting that Justice Burger, the author of the opinion in Lemon, also wrote the opinion in 
Marsh that neglected to apply the tests to legislative prayer). 
 20. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983) (upholding the 
constitutionality of Nebraska’s legislative prayer practices that employed a chaplain, paid 
by the state, to open each legislative session). 
 21. See id. (identifying that Ernest Chambers brought the action under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983). 
 22. See id. at 786 (explaining that the tradition of legislative prayer has existed in the 
United States since colonial times, persisted through the nation’s founding, and coexisted 
with “principles of disestablishment and religious freedom” ever since). 
 23. See id. at 787 (noting the lack of legislative prayer during the Constitutional 
Convention and emphasizing Congress’s appointment of committees to establish a 
statute that would provide compensation to chaplains). 
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prayer.24  Legislative prayer has been and, according to Marsh, will remain 
a tradition so long as the prayer practice does not proselytize or advance a 
particular religion and does not disparage other faiths.25 
Taken alone, Marsh v. Chambers, appeared to create an exception to 
Establishment Clause doctrine.26  Confusion spawned from the majority 
opinion’s failure to apply the dominant Establishment Clause test, the Lemon 
Test, in the context of legislative prayer.27  Instead, the Court in Marsh relied 
on a historical analysis to uphold the practice’s constitutionality by treating 
legislative prayer differently than other Establishment Clause claims such as 
school prayer.28  Nevertheless, Justice Brennan’s dissent in Marsh illustrates 
that if the Court applied the Lemon Test, legislative prayer would undeniably 
fail all three prongs.29  The Court did not address the issue of legislative 
prayer again until three decades after the ruling of Marsh.30 
2. Town of Greece v. Galloway: An Expansion of Marsh 
Since 1983, lower courts have struggled with the question of whether and 
how the ruling in Marsh applied to prayer practices in city councils and 
                                                          
 24. See id. at 814-815 (announcing that James Madison, a strong proponent of 
religious freedom and the drafter of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 
voted for the bill authorizing payment of chaplains in 1789). 
 25. See Kenneth A. Klukowski, In Whose Name We Pray: Fixing the Establishment 
Clause Train Wreck Involving Legislative Prayer, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219, 222 
(2008) (adopting dicta from Marsh to create a standard applicable to future cases 
questioning legislative prayer practices). 
 26. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (concluding the majority 
was simply carving out an exception to the Establishment Clause rather than reshaping 
existing doctrine to accommodate legislative prayer because the majority neglected to 
analyze the prayer practices through settled doctrine). 
 27. See generally Scott W. Gaylord, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Marsh 
and Sectarian Legislative Prayer Post-Summum, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1017, 1019 (2011) 
(highlighting that the majority opinion failed to mention Lemon v. Kurtzman, let alone 
distinguish the case). 
 28. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the 
Court’s limited rationale shall not threaten the overall fate of the Establishment Clause). 
 29. See id. at 800-801 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that law students 
applying the principles of the Lemon test to legislative prayer nearly unanimously find 
the practice to be unconstitutional). 
 30. See David Masci, 5 Facts About the U.S. Supreme Court’s Public Prayer Case, 
PEW RES. CTR. (November 6, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/11/
06/5-facts-about-the-u-s-supreme-courts-public-prayer-case/ (suggesting the Court’s 
ruling in a new legislative prayer case would hinge on whether the new panel of judges 
interprets Marsh broadly or narrowly). 
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county commissioner offices.31  The Court addressed this inquiry and 
elucidated many of the questions surrounding the Marsh opinion in response 
to a suit filed in 2013 by citizens of Greece, New York, requesting an 
injunction to limit the opening prayer practice at the town’s public board 
meetings to inclusive and nonsectarian prayers.32 
The town’s monthly board meetings opened with an invocation led by a 
local clergy member.33  Even though all of the participating clergy from 
1999-2007 were Christian, the town maintained that it would never exclude 
or deny an opportunity to any prospective prayer giver.34  Despite the explicit 
references to the Christian faith during the town’s opening prayers, the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the prayer practice as permissible under the 
Establishment Clause because the board’s informal selection method did not 
exclude religions other than Christianity and permitted other religious groups 
to give the invocation.35 
The opinion in Town of Greece directly rejects the long-standing 
assumption that Marsh carved an exception into the Establishment Clause 
by explaining that the majority in Marsh did not find applications of formal 
tests necessary because the history of legislative prayer provided ample 
support for its holding.36  The Court’s analysis in Town of Greece, unlike 
                                                          
 31. See Perry Dane, Prayer Is Serious Business: Reflections on Town of Greece, 15 
RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 611, 614 (2014) (exploring whether, under Marsh, lower 
courts may find practices “too sectarian” and therefore a violation of the Establishment 
Clause). 
 32. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1817 (2014) (noting the 
respondents did not seek to end the town’s prayer practice). 
 33. See id. at 1816 (indicating the prayer practice initiated in 1999 by a newly elected 
town supervisor who adopted the practice from his time serving in the county 
legislature). 
 34. See id. (indicating the town selected prayer givers from a list of local 
congregations that are majority Christian); see also Dominic Perella, As Supreme Court 
Tackles Legislative Prayer, It’s 1789 All Over Again, MSNBC (Nov. 6, 2013, 4:35 PM) 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/supreme-court-tackles-legislative (expressing 
petitioners’ anguish that the board only began allowing clergy from other faiths to give 
the invocation after petitioner filed formal complaints). 
 35. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1816-18 (noting references to distinct language 
that invoked Christian religious holidays, scripture, and occasionally doctrine). 
 36. See Paul Horwitz, The Religious Geography of the Town of Greece v. Galloway, 
2014 SUP. CT. REV. 243, 250 (2014) (explaining that the Court uses the Establishment 
Clause doctrine as a supplement to its analysis rather than historical support as an 
exception); see also Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819 (noting that a test that sweeps 
away settled practices would create controversy and awaken the very religious divisions 
the Establishment Clause seeks to prevent). 
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Marsh, does not stop at a historical inquiry.37  While legislative prayer is 
constitutional, courts determine whether the particular prayer practice falls 
within the traditional scope of the Establishment Clause by evaluating if the 
prayer is given to solemnize rather than proselytize.38  Petitioners claimed 
that the town’s practices were outside the purview of tradition because the 
prayers were sectarian and the setting of the board meetings elicits social 
pressures forcing nonadherents to participate for fear of being ostracized.39 
The Court rejected the notion that the constitutionality of legislative prayer 
hinges on the neutrality of the content because the proposition is inconsistent 
with the facts and holding in Marsh; therefore, the Court denied the 
petitioners’ request to enjoin the sectarian language of the prayers in 
Greece.40  The Court refused to issue a judicial decree that such prayers 
remain nonsectarian; however, the Court implied that content is not 
necessarily free from all constraints if the remarks disparage nonadherents, 
threaten damnation, or preach conversion.41 
Furthermore, the Court denied petitioner’s request to distinguish this case 
from Marsh because prayers at town board meetings and invocations before 
Congress are fundamentally different.42  The Court noted that the intended 
audience of the opening prayers were lawmakers rather than the members of 
the public in attendance and that the prayers were offered to elevate the mind 
of officials before governing.43  Even though the Court found no evidence of 
                                                          
 37. See Krista M. Pikus, Hopeful Clarity or Hopeless Disarray?: An Examination of 
Town of Greece v. Galloway and the Establishment Clause, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 387, 
388 (2015) (clarifying that the analysis used by the court focused on history and 
nondiscriminatory procedure rather than a settled Establishment Clause test). 
 38. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1824 (identifying that a challenge based purely 
on the content of the prayer will likely not establish a violation). 
 39. See id. (emphasizing the coercive nature of the prayer practice which forces 
members of minority faiths to partake in behavior against their beliefs for fear of 
offending the officials that will vote on matters before the board). 
 40. See id. at 1821-1822 (explaining the contention that legislative prayer must be 
nonsectarian came from dictum in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, and further asserting 
that the content of prayer is not the concern of the judges unless the practice attempts to 
proselytize, advance, or inhibit any one faith). 
 41. See id. at 1822 (finding that a holding that invocations must be nonsectarian 
would force legislatures to censor religious speech, creating an even greater government 
involvement in religious matters). 
 42. See id. at 1824-25 (suggesting the intimate nature of town board meetings where 
citizens come to speak on local issues, petition for action by the board, or seek permits 
creates a coercive atmosphere for the nonbeliever that does not wish to offend board 
members or fellow citizens). 
 43. See id. at 1826 (noting that while some members of the public may find meaning 
in the prayers and wish to join, the prayers should enlighten the lawmakers). 
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coercion in the prayer practices in Town of Greece, the Court noted its 
analysis would be different if town board members directed the public to 
partake in the prayers, showed bias toward dissidents, or specifed that a 
failure to participate affects their governing decisions.44  Today, there is a 
circuit split regarding whether prayers led directly by commissioners at local 
board meetings go beyond constitutionally permitted legislative prayer.45 
C. Circuit Split on Legislator-Led Prayer 
1. Lund v. Rowan County 
The Board of Commissioners in Lund held the practice of personally 
delivering a deliberate sectarian prayer at the start of each county board 
meeting inconsistent with the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.46  In Lund, board members were permitted to use their 
discretion as to the content of the prayer during their rotation, but 
undoubtedly all commissioners gave prayers filled with Christian sentiment 
by invoking the name of the Lord as the one true way to salvation.47  The 
Fourth Circuit distinguished Lund from Town of Greece by stating that the 
Supreme Court did not address lawmaker-led prayer, only prayer led by 
clergy.48  Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit determined that prayer led by 
legislators may fit within the constitutional bounds, but the prayer practices 
of the Lund County Board of Commissioners fell outside the scope of 
traditionally protected legislative prayer due to the attempts made by 
commissioners to promote Christianity as the one true religion.49 
2. Bormuth v. County of Jackson 
Just two months after the Fourth Circuit decided Lund, the Sixth Circuit 
upheld similar lawmaker-led prayer practices in Bormuth v. County of 
                                                          
 44. See id. (indicating that clergy members invited members of the public to stand 
and participate, rather than the board members directly instructing them to do so). 
 45. See Gregory, supra note 7 (summarizing the uncertainty created when the Sixth 
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of legislator-led prayer in direct opposition to a 
Fourth Circuit holding just months prior). 
 46. See Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 272 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (indicating 
the prayer practice only permitted commissioners to offer the invocation). 
 47. See id. at 273 (demonstrating that 97 percent of the board’s prayers over the past 
five and a half years made purely Christian references such as “Jesus,” “Christ,” or 
“Savior” and the commissioners referenced no other religion). 
 48. See id. at 277-78 (elaborating that the “historical practice of prayer” is not 
identical to the challenge before the Fourth Circuit). 
 49. See id. at 289 (establishing that the court should look at the prayer practice 
holistically to determine the constitutionality of the practice). 
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Jackson because a historical analysis showed that such prayer had a long-
standing tradition with roots in the American Revolutionary period and 
reportedly began in Michigan in 1879.50  The Sixth Circuit described the 
prayers as largely solemn, reverent, and contemplative.51  The court indicated 
that pro se litigant Bormuth failed to meet his burden to prove that the Board 
attempted to indoctrinate, coerce participation, or allocate benefits or 
burdens with respect to his adherence.52  The Court acknowledged that 
commissioners in Bormuth lost their cool and acted negatively toward the 
petitioner; however, nothing in the record indicated the behavior resulted 
from the petitioner’s discontent with the prayer practice.53 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. A Fact-Sensitive Analysis Demonstrates that Both the Fourth and Sixth 
Circuits Correctly Applied Establishment Clause Jurisprudence to the 
Facts Before Each Circuit Notwithstanding the Conflicting Rulings 
This year, the Fourth Circuit and Sixth Circuit heard cases challenging the 
constitutionality of prayer practices at local community board meetings 
where opening prayers were led directly by the commissioners of the board.54  
The directly opposing outcomes elicited from the Circuit Courts’ opinions 
implied that one circuit court ruled correctly while the other misapplied 
precedent; however, the fact-sensitive consideration required in 
Establishment Clause inquiries regarding legislative prayer proves that both 
circuits ruled correctly with the record of facts presented before them.55  A 
                                                          
 50. See Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 510 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(explaining that the historical reliance here parallels those relied on in Marsh and Town 
of Greece). 
 51. See id. at 497-98 (suggesting the Board opens its public meetings with prayers 
consistent with the historical practices of Congress and state legislatures, which the Court 
upheld as consistent with the First Amendment). 
 52. See id. at 519 (stating that there is nothing in the record that suggests that the 
actions against Bormuth were the result of his religious beliefs or evidence to rebut the 
presumption that adults understand the purpose of invocations). 
 53. See id. at 545 (Moore, J., dissenting) (indicating that the commissioners turned 
their chairs around while petitioner Bormuth spoke at a meeting and made statements to 
the press after litigation commenced). 
 54. Compare Lund, 863 F.3d at 271 (holding the prayer practices of the Board of 
Commissioners in Rowan County unconstitutional), with Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498 
(upholding the prayer practices of the County of Jackson commissioners as consistent 
with the First Amendment). 
 55. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1814 (2014) (establishing that 
challenges to legislative prayer require a fact-sensitive inquiry into the “setting in which 
the prayer arises and the audience to whom it is directed” to show the town leaders are 
10
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difference of ruling among the circuits is not surprising when looking at the 
prayer practices illustrated in each record and subsequently reviewed by each 
circuit sitting en banc.56  Unlike the commissioners in Bormuth that simply 
mentioned the Christian faith during prayers by referencing Jesus or the Holy 
Spirit, commissioners in Lund made attempts to proselytize by expressing 
that Jesus is the only way to salvation and condemn nonbelievers by holding 
out that Christianity is superior to other religions.57  The prayer practice in 
Rowan County portrayed the Board’s endorsement of Christianity.58  The 
subtle distinctions between the prayer practices illustrate that the practice in 
Lund, unlike Bormuth, exceeded the traditional scope of legislative prayer 
by holding out Christianity as superior to other religions.59  Through the 
application of Marsh and Town of Greece, both courts ruled correctly 
regardless of the apparently conflicting rulings on similar issues in the same 
year because the factual distinctions warrant the courts’ respective 
outcomes.60 
1. Legislator-Led Prayer Inquiries Require Courts to Take a Totality of 
Circumstances Approach Because a Single Factor Analysis Is Inconsistent 
with Supreme Court Precedent. 
When weighing the facts of particular prayer practices, a court must first 
evaluate the prayer practice against the backdrop of the historical practice of 
legislative prayer that has become so significant to the nation’s heritage and 
                                                          
not coercing the members of the public to engage in religious activities that are not of his 
or her own conscience). 
 56. Compare Lund, 863 F.3d at 273 (describing the prayer practices as “invariably 
and unmistakably Christian in content”), with Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 509-10 (describing 
the prayers as consistent with the traditionally permitted prayers given before Congress 
as an act to solemnize the proceeding). 
 57. Compare Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498 (informing that the prayers asked for 
blessings for community members facing hardships and military members), with Lund, 
863 F.3d at 273 (emphasizing that Christianity is the only religion represented in prayers 
referring to “King of kings and Lord of lords,” asking for forgiveness of sins, and 
proclaiming God as the only way to happiness and an everlasting eternal life). 
 58. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 283 (stating that the identification of a state with one 
religion cannot be ignored and doing so equates to wishing away the Establishment 
Clause). 
 59. Compare Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498 (noting that the Board adopted the prayer 
practice without discriminatory intent to any religion) with Lund, 863 F.3d at 282 
(highlighting that the risk of division stemming from the prayer practice causes more 
than an abstract concern for constitutional protections). 
 60. See Gregory, supra note 7 (noting the rigid discrepancies between the Fourth 
Circuit and Sixth Circuit rulings regarding legislator-led prayer). 
11
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tradition.61  Historical analysis is important because prayer practices that fall 
outside the generally accepted practice of solemnizing governmental 
proceedings and either endorse one religion or condemn patrons of other 
faiths violate the First Amendment’s disestablishment principles.62  In 
addition to considering history, the court must consider the setting of the 
prayer, the intended audience of the invocation, and the pattern of prayers 
offered when evaluating whether the prayer practice is permissible.63  This 
analysis will help to determine whether the prayer practice is permissible if 
the practice falls within the traditional scope accepted by the Court or 
whether the prayer practice is impermissible because the practice is used to 
proselytize and promote one religion over others or condemns and burdens 
nonadherents.64  A prayer practice is impermissible if it is overly coercive, 
attempts to indoctrinate, or condemns nonbelievers.65 
It is crucial to assess the totality of the circumstances rather than dissecting 
and evaluating the prayer practice piece by piece because a singular 
statement may be permissible when given by a clergy member before 
Congress but impermissible when given by a government official, acting in 
his official capacity, such as at a town hall meeting.66  Citizens in attendance 
at local board meetings experience these prayer practices in their entirety 
rather than piece by piece; therefore, courts must consider all of the facts 
                                                          
 61. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1814 (2014) (assuming that 
a “reasonable observer” witnessing opening prayers at government meetings is familiar 
with the tradition and understands the purpose of the prayer is to solemnize and 
acknowledge the role of religion in the lives of many private citizens); see also Cty. of 
Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989) (stating that history 
affects the permissibility of religious references by the government, but history cannot 
legitimate practices that identify the government with any particular religion or sect). 
 62. See Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in 
part and dissenting in part) (asserting that Marsh exemplifies that the Establishment 
Clause must be interpreted in reference to historical practices, not that historical 
foundations creates an automatic exception). 
 63. See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (explaining that the 
Establishment Clause does not prohibit the regulation of conduct simply because it is 
intertwined with religious cannons). 
 64. See id. (suggesting that the invocations should be given for the benefit of the 
elected officials to elevate spirits before setting one’s mind to the governance of the 
people rather than to “benefit” the public in attendance). 
 65. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1824 (noting a single prayer will not 
necessarily depredate a prayer practice that reflects the tradition of legislative prayer). 
 66. See Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 289 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (indicating 
that facts relevant to the court’s inquiry are not necessarily outcome determinative, but 
the court should not overlook the crucial interaction of elements when evaluating the 
constitutionality of the practice). 
12
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surrounding the prayer practices because doing so can accurately determine 
whether the particular prayer practice is permissible.67 
Lund and Bormuth both involve prayer practices led directly by 
commissioners at local board meetings that are open to the public, and both 
practices invoke Christian sentiments throughout the history of their prayer 
practice; however, only the Fourth Circuit, in Lund, held the practices 
unconstitutional.68  The prayers given by Commissioners at the local town 
meetings in Rowan County, North Carolina, explicitly stated that God was 
the only way to eternal life and confessed for the sins of all in attendance 
while dissidents were booed and jeered for failure to participate.69  While 
one stray remark or exclusively Christian statement may not constitute a 
violation, when taken in totality, the practice in Rowan County clearly 
attempts to indoctrinate and allocate a burden to nonadherents.70  The Sixth 
Circuit, in Bormuth, determined the practice of the County of Jackson Board 
of Commissioners consistent with those upheld by the Supreme Court in 
Marsh and Town of Greece.71  In Bormuth, the court found the prayer 
statements reported in the district court record were made to solemnize the 
meeting rather than indoctrinate attendees with a religion preferred by the 
members of the board; the stray references to the Christian faith were not 
enough to “despoil” the practice without evidence of indoctrination or 
condemnation of nonadherents.72  When considered in totality, the courts 
correctly determined the permissibility of the respective prayer practice 
                                                          
 67. See Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 539 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(Moore, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)) (noting 
the Supreme Court has the use of a “divide and conquer” approach to analyzing 
constitutional challenges of multi-faceted practices). 
 68. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 273 (indicating that after controversy grew, several 
Commissioners announced they planned to continue giving the Christian prayers for the 
benefit of the public). 
 69. See id. at 285 (quoting a prayer from August 2010: “God of healing mercies, we 
come to you this day confessing that we are an imperfect people . . . .  We acknowledge 
that we’ve been given the pathway to peace, in the witness of Jesus Christ . . . .  [But] 
oftentimes we have failed to witness on Earth.”). 
 70. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 512-13 (explaining that one remark does not 
necessarily despoil an entire prayer practice that would otherwise fall within the tradition 
accepted by Marsh). 
 71. See id. at 498 (explaining the prayer practice implemented by the Jackson County 
Board of Commissioners). 
 72. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 272 (emphasizing that the prayer practice crossed a line 
by identifying government with Christianity and potentially conveying that other faiths 
were unwelcome); see also Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498 (stating that the prayer practice is 
facially neutral and possessed no discriminatory intent). 
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because the factual records warranted different outcomes.73 
2. While the Intimate Setting of County Commissioner Meetings Included 
Many Nonadherents, the Prayer Practices Are Not Impermissible Unless 
Commissioners Attempt to Indoctrinate or Allocate Benefits or Burdens 
Based on Attendees’ Participation. 
Marsh and Town of Greece determined that legislative prayer in hearings 
at state legislatures and local board meetings, like invocations before 
Congressional hearings, fit within the well-accepted tradition recognized by 
the Court.74  Petitioners in both Lund and Bormuth argue that the intimate 
setting of the prayer practice is coercive because nonadherents feel 
compelled to participate for fear of being ostracized.75  Prayer practices that 
rise to the level of coercion are impermissible because the First Amendment 
prohibits the government from coercing citizens to support or participate in 
religious exercises against one’s own religious beliefs and devotions.76  
Prayer practices at local board meetings are not automatically deemed 
coercive as a result of a more intimate setting.77  However, analysis differs if 
the elected officials direct the participation in the prayer practice because this 
direction can be coercive, compelling many attendees to participate for fear 
of heeding the burdens that result from opposing the directions of the 
lawmakers before them.78 
                                                          
 73. Compare Lund, 863 F.3d at 272 (ruling that the prayer practice made attempts to 
proselytize and convert attendees), with Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 512-13 (holding that stray 
remarks do not constitute an impermissible practice). 
 74. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (upholding legislative prayer 
in the Nebraska Legislature); see also Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 
1815-816 (2014) (recognizing that no constitutional violation existed in the informal 
prayer selecting method used by the town’s board). 
 75. Compare Lund, 863 F.3d at 288 (suggesting plaintiffs’ discomfort with the 
prayer practice is not trivial), with Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 528 (holding that Bormuth’s 
claim of coercion fails under either standard of coercion set forth in Town of Greece). 
 76. Compare Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 694 (2005) (finding that statues of 
the Ten Commandments at the Texas State Capital did not violate the Establishment 
Clause after determining that mere presence did not compel the petitioner to read or even 
look at the statue; mere offense is not coercion), with Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 
U.S. 573, 628 (1989) (specifying that the Court has never relied on coercion alone as the 
hallmark of Establishment Clause analysis). 
 77. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1818 (reversing the Court of Appeals and 
holding the prayer practice at the local board meeting to be consistent with the tradition 
and transgresses permitted by First Amendment). 
 78. See id. at 1825 (acknowledging that board members in Greece, New York, 
participated in the prayers but never gestured for the citizens in attendance to solicit their 
participation in the prayer practice). 
14
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The commissioners in both Lund and Bormuth directed the prayer practice 
by asking the attendees to stand and pray with them.79  Alone, the 
Commissioners’ directions do not amount to coercion if attendees can 
willingly opt out of participating in the prayer practice, and abstention does 
not result in mistreatment of nonadherent attendees.80  Commissioners in 
neither Lund nor Bormuth prohibited attendees from arriving at the meetings 
late or merely sitting during the invocation, which allows nonadherents to 
avoid the prayer practice completely or sit idly while it takes place.81  The 
petitioner in Bormuth admitted to refusing to participate because the practice 
was inconsistent with his Pagan beliefs.82  The mistreatment and disfavor 
expressed to dissidents in Lund demonstrates the impermissibility of the 
Rowan County Board of Commissioners’ prayer practice.83  The petitioner 
in Bormuth failed to prove that the board treated dissidents in Jackson 
County differently due to failure to partake in the prayer practice.84  It is 
possible that Jackson County Commissioners’ personal disagreements with 
petitioner Bormuth resulted from Bormuth’s disposition on other matters 
throughout the course of the meetings rather than his distain toward the 
opening invocations.85  The requests by commissioners to stand and pray in 
both Lund and Bormuth do not trigger an impermissible coercion because 
the attendees could opt out of the prayer practice; however, when 
                                                          
 79. Compare Lund, 863 F.3d at 272 (conveying that all five members of the Board 
of Commissioners rise and bow their heads just before the commissioner leading the 
prayer asks all in attendance to join him in worship), with Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498 
(specifying that the Chairman of the Board typically asks his fellow Commissioners and 
citizens in attendance to “rise and assume a reverent position.”). 
 80. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825 (noting that direction to stand and pray 
given by the guest minister was inclusive rather than coercive because ministers were 
likely accustomed to directing their congregation in the same manner, so the court 
continued the analysis to determine if evidence supported a finding of impermissible 
indirect coercion, which it determined not to be present). 
 81. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 274 (suggesting these options seemed to only serve to 
marginalize attendees who were uncomfortable with the observance of the prayer 
practice at the board meeting).  
 82. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 516-17 (noting that petitioner Bormuth’s “quiet 
acquiescence” should not interpreted as acceptance of the expressed ideas). 
 83. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 288 (identifying that others booed the only attendee who 
openly objected to the prayer practice). 
 84. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 517-19 (indicating that petitioner Bormuth believed 
that commissioners excluded him because of his Pagan beliefs but the court attributed no 
weight to his allegations). 
 85. See id. at 517 (specifying that petitioner Bormuth’s vocal stance on controversial 
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commissioners burden nonadherents, such as booing nonparticipants, the 
practice may become too coercive and consequently exceed the scope of 
Marsh and Town of Greece.86 
In addition to the setting, courts must consider the proximity of the prayer 
to governmental action, such as voting on issues before the board, to 
determine the potential for coercion for a particular prayer practice in its 
setting.87  Petitioners in Lund and Bormuth advance a similar argument as 
petitioners in Town of Greece by asserting that constituents in attendance 
feel pressured to participate in the prayer practice to avoid negative 
consequences from the lawmakers at their local county commissioners’ 
meetings.88  Attendees at local board meetings often petition for rights and 
benefits, advocate for important community causes, and participate in 
democracy.89  Participation or failure to participate during the recognition of 
invocation should not affect how commissioners rule on the matters brought 
before the board because the Establishment Clause prohibits such actions by 
state agencies due to evidence of favor or disfavor of any religion.90 
In Lund, the commissioners conducted business moments after the prayer; 
the board members considered and subsequently approved or denied the 
petitions put forth by the citizens in attendance.91  Alternatively, in Bormuth, 
                                                          
 86. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1826 (2014) (stating 
Commissioners and fellow citizens should not find a nonbeliever’s absence disrespectful 
or noteworthy or a nonadherent’s acquiescence as an agreement with the expressed 
notions). 
 87. Compare Lund, 863 F.3d at 288 (indicating that the commissioners considering 
the attendee’s petitions moments after the invocation presents, at the very least, an 
opportunity for abuse), with Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 516 (referencing that the plurality in 
Town of Greece rejected Justice Kagan’s dissent describing the “chasm” between prayers 
on given the legislative floor and prayers given at intimate town hall meetings (citing 
Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1851-52 (Kagan, J., dissenting))). 
 88. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 516 (indicating that nothing in the record suggests that 
the members of the board in Greece, New York gave preference to attendees that 
participated or ruled on issues in a way that disadvantaged nonadherents to the prayer 
practice). 
 89. See generally Lund, 863 F.3d at 287-88 (articulating that attendance at one’s 
place of government and one’s place of worship are very different). 
 90. See id. at 287 (revealing that attendance at these local board meetings are not 
always completely voluntary because the citizens in attendance are advancing programs 
that they are passionate about or petitioning for changes that directly affect their 
communities). 
 91. See id. at 288 (explaining that the board had many functions, including 
adjudicatory power over zoning petitions, permit applications, and contract awards); see 
also Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1829 (Alito, J. concurring) (pointing out that 
legislative acts, rather than adjudicatory acts, proceeded the prayer practice in Greece, 
16
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the neutral prayer practice permitted prayers followed by the Pledge of 
Allegiance and then proceeded by legislative and adjudicatory business 
matters.92  At first glance, the practices do not seem significantly dissimilar, 
yet the court distinguished between proximity of prayers to legislative and 
adjudicatory matters to illustrate citizen compulsion present at the start of 
the meeting, when the invocation typically takes place.93 
3. Prayer Practices That Attempt to Indoctrinate or Proselytize the 
Public in Attendance, Rather Than to Solemnize the Meeting Before 
Lawmakers Preside Over Important Matters, Fall Outside the Traditional 
Scope of Prayer Practices. 
Traditionally, the Court has held that legislative prayer, regardless of 
setting, solemnizes and invokes heavenly guidance to set the mind in a frame 
appropriate for making decisions.94  Prayers are given to exalt legislators 
before conducting business, not to proselytize or indoctrinate the citizens in 
attendance.95  Courts presume that a reasonable adult observer is well aware 
of this tradition and understands its purpose to solemnize and to recognize 
the importance of religion to the lives of many citizens in this nation.96 
In Lund, the content of the prayer expanded beyond merely reminding 
commissioners of a higher purpose; the language targeted members of the 
                                                          
New York). 
 92. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498 (explaining that the prayer practice in Jackson 
County, Michigan, rotated the opportunity for commissioners to pray in accordance to 
the commissioner’s own conscience without review of another member or the board as a 
whole). 
 93. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1829 (Alito, J., concurring) (declaring that 
invocations do not take place before the second part of the meeting, the portion where 
the board in Greece, New York conducted its adjudicatory duties). 
 94. See id. at 1816 (noting the town’s informal method for selecting local clergy to 
give the invocation). 
 95. See id. at 1825 (indicating that the prayers in Greece, New York targeted only 
the legislators). Compare Lund, 863 F.3d at 287 (stating that the record clearly depicts 
that the commissioners sought audience involvement), with Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 512 
(announcing that while the prayers varied in degree of religiosity, no evidence existed of 
attempts to proselytize, threats of damnation to nonbelievers, or endeavors to convert). 
 96. See also Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 530-31 (relaying the Sixth Circuit Court’s view 
that solicitation of adults to participate in the solemnization of meetings by standing 
quietly is not inherently coercive).  Compare Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825 
(assuming that adults firm in their own beliefs can tolerate a ceremonial prayer of a 
different faith), with Doe. v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 275 (3rd Cir. 2011) 
(ruling prayers at school board meeting impermissible and suggesting that there is a 
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audience.97  The content of the prayers in Lund urged those in attendance to 
believe in God and embrace the religion of Christianity and preached 
Christianity as the only way to deliverance.98  While the prayers in Bormuth 
mentioned specifically Christian references by praying to Jesus and God 
Almighty, the prayers made by the commissioners in the County of Jackson 
fell within the “religious idiom accepted by our Founders” because they were 
not given in effort to convert attendees but merely for the purpose of 
solemnization.99 
Furthermore, an examination of the pattern of prayer illustrates the 
potential of prayer practices to cross from solemnization to 
proselytization.100  While prayer practices may not preach conversion or 
condemn other faiths, the content of legislative prayers is not required to be 
nonsectarian.101  As indicated by Town of Greece, individual prayer givers 
must be allowed to give prayers that align with their conscience.102  A 
singular or even occasional sectarian prayer that references a god associated 
with only one faith is not enough to conclude the prayer practice 
unconstitutional.103  However, where there appears to be an improper prayer 
practice, courts must examine the entire record.104 
The Sixth Circuit, in Bormuth, conceded commissioners made exclusively 
                                                          
 97. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 287 (noting that one commissioner asked attendees to join 
him in prayers that asked the world to acknowledge and trust that God sent his son, Jesus 
Christ, to “save us from our sins”). 
 98. See id. at 285 (specifying that one prayer asked God to enable the Commissioners 
to spread God’s message). 
 99. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 512 (clarifying that reference to the Christian faith does 
not make the prayer practice fall outside the purview of the Establishment Clause). 
 100. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1826-27 (implying that review of a particular 
prayer practice is warranted if there is a substantial likelihood for coercion to determine 
whether the prayer practice comports with the tradition of respectful and solemn prayer). 
 101. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (indicating that it is not the 
Court’s job to parse the content of a particular prayer unless the prayer opportunity has 
been exploited to convert or disparage nonbelievers); see also Town of Greece, 134 S. 
Ct. at 1814 (maintaining that Marsh was not upheld because of the use of general 
terminology, but rather because the principles of disestablishment and religious freedom 
can coexist in the context of legislative prayer). 
 102. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1822 (suggesting that requiring all prayers to 
be nonsectarian would force courts to censor religious speech which is contrary to the 
essence of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment). 
 103. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 512 (acknowledging that one remark pales in 
comparison to the repetitive attempts to advance Christianity recognized by the Fourth 
Circuit in Lund). 
 104. See Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 283 (4th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the 
record includes the content and transcripts of the invocations). 
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Christian references but concluded that these references, such as invoking 
the name of Jesus or the Holy Spirit, do not denigrate nonbelievers or preach 
conversion.105  Conversely, the prayer practices analyzed by the Fourth 
Circuit in Lund depict a pattern of attempts to convert nonbelievers and 
demean minority religions by indicating that Christianity is supreme to all 
other religions.106 
4. The Identity of the Prayer Giver As a Legislator Is Not Per Se 
Unconstitutional and Thus, Constitutional Challenges Require an 
Individual Evaluation of the Prayer Practice in Question. 
The Supreme Court has yet to address the notion that the identity of the 
prayer giver is per se inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.107  The 
plurality in Town of Greece cautioned that the analysis would be different if 
the board members directed the public to participate in the opening 
prayers.108  The identity of the prayer giver can play a significant role in 
determining if coercion exists.109  There is a more significant threat of 
coercion when the prayer giver requesting attendants’ participation are the 
same individuals that will ultimately vote on the matter brought before the 
board at the meeting.110  However, the identity of the prayer giver as a 
                                                          
 105. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 512-13 (illustrating one prayer identified by the 
petitioner that specifically spoke of blessing Christians that may be targets of 
“extremists”). 
 106. See Lund, 863 F. 3d at 283-85 (quoting prayers that preach conversion of 
nonadherents: “Father, I pray that all may be one as you, Father, are in Jesus, and He in 
you. I pray that they may be one in you, that the world may believe that you sent Jesus 
to save us from our sins. May we hunger and thirst for righteousness, be made perfect in 
holiness, and be preserved, whole and entire, spirit, soul, and body, irreproachable at the 
coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.”). 
 107. Compare Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 512 (determining that the identity of the prayer 
giver should not determine the constitutionality of the practice because that analysis 
deems permissible prayers unconstitutional solely based on the agent delivering the 
prayer), with Lund, 863 F.3d at 281 (indicating that courts should consider the prayer 
giver’s identity when evaluating the other elements of the practice). 
 108. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1826 (2014) (suggesting the 
analysis only changes if the elected officials treated nonadherents differently for failure 
to participate). 
 109. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 281 (suggesting that the court evaluated other elements 
through the lens of the prayer giver’s identity because the prayer giver was an agent of 
the state).  But see Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 513 (implying that the religious references 
reflected the individual Commissioners’ beliefs rather than the opinions of the Jackson 
County Board). 
 110. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 319 (explaining the standard from Town of Greece that 
state coercion may exist when the lawmaker directs the public to participate, singles out 
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legislator has not been found per se unconstitutional; rather each prayer 
practice requires individual evaluation.111  In its holding, the Fourth Circuit 
in Lund notes that lawmaker-led prayer is not per se unconstitutional but 
finds it difficult to discern if any constitutional limitations exist to legislative 
prayer if the court permitted the practices of the Rowan County Board of 
Commissioners to continue.112 
Town of Greece suggests that the Court is more concerned with the effect 
of the prayer practice creating instances of coercion, indoctrination, or 
condemnation of nonadherents than the identity of the prayer giver.113  
Consequently, Bormuth remains consistent with existing jurisprudence 
because the Sixth Circuit held there was not enough evidence in the record 
to support Mr. Bormuth’s claims that the County of Jackson Board of 
Commissioners exceeded scope of traditionally accepted solemn prayer 
practices.114 
B. The Sixth Circuit Would Have Reached a Different Outcome If the 
Court Considered Evidence that the Pro Se Petitioner, Bormuth, Failed to 
Maintain in the District Court Record. 
Upon appeal from the district court, Americans United for Separation of 
Church and State (Americans United) filed an amicus brief to strengthen 
appellant Bormuth’s position.115  Americans United, on behalf of Bormuth, 
                                                          
nonadherents, or indicates his decisions are influenced by participation or lack of 
participation in the religious practice). Contra Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 508-09 (noting that 
social pressures do not necessarily equate coercion because Justices Thomas and Scalia 
hold the opinions that “coercion is limited to ‘coercive state establishments’ ‘by force of 
law or threat of penalty’” (quoting Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct, at 1837 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and in judgment))). 
 111. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 280 (noting that legislator-led prayer has its limits just as 
sectarian prayers do); see also Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 509 (denying petitioner Bormuth’s 
contention that legislator-led prayer is per se unconstitutional). 
 112. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 290 (noting that the court’s holding is a limited ruling on 
the specific prayer practices at the specific setting of the commissioner meetings). 
 113. See generally Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1826 (suggesting that while not 
present in this case, if circumstances arise alleging that legislative prayer demeans 
nonadherents or imposes a religious dogma, claims arising out of those circumstances 
may succeed). 
 114. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498 (holding that the legislator-led prayer was 
consistent with the Constitution). 
 115. AU Files Brief in Michigan Legislative Prayer Case, CHURCH & STATE MAG. 
(May 2017), https://au.org/church-state/may-2017-church-state/people-events/au-files-
brief-in-michigan-legislative-prayer-case (informing that Americans United, 
accompanied by the American Civil Liberties Union, filed a brief opposing the County 
of Jackson prayer practice because commissioners led exclusively Christian prayers and 
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attempted to illustrate the constitutional violations produced by the prayer 
practice by supplementing evidence presented by petitioner Bormuth.116 
Judges in the Sixth Circuit decided sua sponte to hear the case en banc 
after a panel of Sixth Circuit Judges ruled the County of Jackson prayer 
practice to be a violation of the Establishment Clause while considering the 
additional evidence.117  The Sixth Circuit sitting en banc declined to hear 
certain facts considered in the earlier panel because the district court 
previously denied appellant Bormuth’s motion to supplement the record.118  
The court did not consider the evidence offered on appeal due to a procedural 
restriction prohibiting the introduction of new evidence on appeal even when 
the evidence offered by the appellant presented a genuine issue of material 
fact.119  The additional evidence included statements made by commissioners 
criticizing Bormuth for questioning the constitutionality of the prayer 
practice, letters from commissioners denying Bormuth positions on two 
committees as a result of his opposition, and videos demonstrating the 
commissioners only gave invocations before meetings open to the public.120  
However, had the additional evidence been evaluated, the Sixth Circuit 
sitting en banc likely would have found that a constitutional violation existed 
because the additional facts showed that commissioners excluded non-
Christian prayer givers from controlling the content of the invocation and 
                                                          
disparaged dissenters of the prayer practice, including Bormuth). 
 116. See generally Brief for Americans United for the Separation of Church and State 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494 (6th 
Cir. 2017) (No. 15-1869) (explaining that the prayer practice violated the Constitution 
because it impermissibly advances Christianity and coerces religious participation). 
 117. See generally Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 849 F.3d 266, 273-76 (6th Cir. 2017), 
aff’d en banc, 870 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017) (determining that the district court abused its 
discretion by granting a motion to quash and denying a motion to supplement the record, 
but holding the errors to be harmless because the record before the district court 
supported Bormuth’s motion for summary judgment as a matter of law). 
 118. See Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 499-500 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(identifying two discovery items that included statements made by Commissioners after 
petitioner Bormuth filed the lawsuit and publicly available videos of the Board of 
Commissioner meetings found on the internet). 
 119. See id. (quoting Chicago Title Insurance Company v. Magnuson and restating 
that the court will not hear factual recitation that differs from the recitation at the district 
court when hearing an appeal of a district court’s decision); see also id. (citing an en banc 
ruling in E.E.O.C v. Ford Motor Company and describing the burden on the opposing 
party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)). 
 120. See id. at 500-01 (emphasizing that Bormuth did not offer any specific video 
evidence at the district court level); see also Bormuth, 849 F.3d at 271-73 (explaining 
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insulted Bormuth for his abstention and disparagement of the prayer 
practice.121 
In an effort to salvage evidence that pro se litigant Bormuth failed to 
maintain on the district court record, Bormuth and amicus curiae claimed the 
video recordings of the Board’s meetings were mentioned within petitioner’s 
briefs and the videos remained on the Board’s website for the public to 
view.122  Alternatively, if the court did not accept the videos as part of the 
record, Bormuth and amicus curiae requested that the court at least take 
judicial notice of the content of the videos for appeal under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 201.123  Judicial notice of the videos may have been warranted 
because the Board in County of Jackson admitted to the accuracy of the 
videos on their website as live recordings of the monthly board of 
commissioner meetings.124  Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc 
denied the request because taking judicial notice of evidence never 
introduced during the fact-finding process might create an evidentiary 
loophole.125  On appeal, Bormuth also questioned the district court’s ruling 
that prevented him from supplementing the record in regards to the Board’s 
decision to deny him appointment to a position on the Board of Public Works 
or the Solid Waste Planning Committee because Bormuth was the most 
qualified person for the position and claimed to be denied as a result of his 
objection to the prayer practice at the monthly meetings.126 
The additional evidence demonstrates that the Board of Commissioners in 
                                                          
 121. See generally Bormuth, 870 F.3d 494 at 543-44 (Moore, J., dissenting) 
(underscoring the details of the prayer practice that led to the conclusion that upholding 
the prayer practice rests in opposition to Justice Alito’s concurrence in Town of Greece 
that identifies a difference between a chaplain and a government official requesting 
citizens to rise and participate in a religious prayer). 
 122. See id. at 499-500 (emphasizing that one need not look past the opinion of the 
magistrate judge or district judge to know that Bormuth failed to provide any video 
evidence to the district court). 
 123. See id. at 501 (specifying that Jackson County concedes the accuracy of the 
videos posted on the website and noting that the court has the necessary information 
needed to take notice). 
 124. See Fed. R. Evid. 201 (indicating that a court may take judicial notice at any 
stage of a proceeding on its own or if presented with the necessary information after one 
party makes a request). 
 125. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 501 (suggesting that accepting evidence on appeal in 
order to reverse a decision made by a district court would subvert the relationship held 
between district and appellate courts). 
 126. See id. at 518-19 (indicating that the court knew more about the application to 
the Board of Public Works but suggesting the record fails to demonstrate the denial of 
the position stemmed from Bormuth’s failure to participate in the prayer practice).   
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Jackson County, Michigan, gave invocations for purposes other than 
solemnizing the meeting for the benefit of the lawmakers and that 
commissioners allocated burdens based on participation in the prayer 
practice.127  These additional facts require a different holding than that 
reached by the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc.128  The first step in analyzing 
whether the prayer practice is permissible requires a court to determine 
whether the prayer practice falls within the traditional scope of legislative 
prayer.129  Traditional legislative prayer permitted governmental bodies to 
solemnize the governmental proceedings to elevate the minds the lawmakers, 
not to promote religion to the public.130  Americans United introduced 
evidence illustrating that the County of Jackson prayer practice did not 
function as a means of solemnizing the Board by offering a video depicting 
that the only meeting during a two year period conducted without an offer of 
invocation occurred on November 6, 2014, when no citizens were in 
attendance.131  These videos demonstrate that the prayer practice falls outside 
the scope of traditional purpose because the County Commissioners did not 
give the invocation to exalt the lawmakers but rather for the “benefit” of the 
public in attendance.132 
The Sixth Circuit sitting en banc upheld the prayer practice, stating that 
the record showed no evidence that the commissioners allocated benefits or 
burdens due to their participation in the prayer practices.133  However, the 
                                                          
 127. Contra id. at 501 (stating in footnote two of the opinion that the disposition of 
the court would not change if the court considered the videos of the recorded Board of 
Commissioner meetings that Bormuth proffered). 
 128. See supra Part II.A (describing the importance of a fact-sensitive analysis in 
Establishment Clause inquiries). 
 129. See supra Part II.A.1 (explaining that court must first evaluate the prayer practice 
against the backdrop of the historical practice); see also Town of Greece v. Galloway, 
134 S. Ct. 1811, 1817 (2014) (indicating that the district court began its analysis by 
reviewing Marsh v. Chambers, which permitted prayer practice so long as the practice 
did not advance or disparage any one religion). 
 130. See Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 272 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(emphasizing that legislative prayer can further both religious exercise and religious 
tolerance). 
 131. See Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 849 F.3d 266, 284-85 (6th Cir. 2017), aff’d en 
banc, 870 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017) (noting that pro se petitioner, Bormuth, waived the 
argument presented by Amicus Americans United that the Board’s choice to only 
conduct prayers in the presence of the public supported the assertion that the 
commissioners offered prayers to promote religion rather than to solemnize the meeting). 
 132. See id. (extrapolating that the Board uses the prayer practice for the purposes of 
proselytizing members of the community in attendance at these meetings). 
 133. See Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 512 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(maintaining that the prayers fall within the restraints required by Town of Greece). 
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additional evidence proffered by Bormuth and Americans United 
demonstrates that the Board treated petitioner Bormuth differently after he 
voiced his disagreements with the prayer practice.134  After litigation 
commenced, local newspapers released statements made by two 
commissioners indicating that the two commissioners perceived Bormuth’s 
abstention as a personal attack on their rights to conduct a prayer before the 
meetings.135  Other Commissioners reportedly turned their backs as Bormuth 
spoke during the public comments portion of the Board’s meeting.136  These 
additional facts trigger the warning put forth in Town of Greece that prayer 
practices must not disparage dissidents or benefit adherents.137 
Bormuth asserted additional instances of the Board of Commissioners 
demonstrating disfavor of his resistance to participate in the prayer practice; 
he claimed that the Board denied appointing him to the Solid Waste Planning 
Committee or the Board of Public Works despite his qualifications for the 
positions.138  Bormuth asserted that he was the most qualified applicant for 
the vacancy on the Board of Public Works and believed the Board of 
Commissioners denied his appointment because of his Pagan religious 
beliefs, his objection to the Christian prayer practice, and his pursuit of the 
lawsuit.139 
Giving weight to these additional facts and taking judicial notice of the 
videos of the County of Jackson monthly meetings demonstrates that the 
prayer practice in place in the County of Jackson, Michigan, is impermissible 
when viewed under the totality of the circumstances.140  The practice falls 
                                                          
 134. See id. at 527 (Moore, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that a newspaper article 
released shortly after petitioner Bormuth filed the suit revealed the Commissioner’s 
disapproval). 
 135. See id. at 517-18 (quoting Commissioner Rice: “Our civil liberties should not be 
taken away from us, as commissioner,” and Commissioner Duckham: “What about my 
right?”). 
 136. See id. (indicating that the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc concedes the 
Commissioners reacted poorly but gave no constitutional weight to the actions of the 
Commissioners). 
 137. See generally Town of Greece v. Galloway 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1826 (2014) 
(distinguishing that petitioners provided no evidence that lawmakers in Greece treated 
citizens differently whether they participate or choose to abstain). 
 138. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 519 (stressing that Bormuth introduced the rejection 
letter regarding the Solid Waste Committee). 
 139. See id. (requiring Bormuth to go “beyond the pleadings” to defeat County of 
Jackson’s motion for summary judgment by providing more evidence than the 
correlation between his objections and the Board’s denial of appointments). 
 140. See id. at 544 (Moore, J., dissenting) (concluding that Commissioners’ attempt 
to silence Bormuth and their treatment illustrate how Jackson County’s prayer practice 
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outside the traditional scope of legislative prayer by directing prayers at 
citizens in the audience and attempting to promote Christian prayer and by 
the Commissioners’ mistreatment of nonadherents. 
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
A. The Supreme Court Should Take Up the Issue to Answer Looming 
Questions Regarding the Constitutionality of Legislator-Led Prayer and 
Establish an Analytical Framework to Be Followed By Lower Courts. 
Currently, a rigid circuit split exists among the Fourth Circuit and Sixth 
Circuit regarding legislator-led prayer.141  Other courts, such as district 
courts, have also issued conflicting rulings due to the Court’s failure to 
provide guidance and answer questions that grew from Town of Greece’s 
conclusion that the analysis would be different if the lawmakers directed the 
audience to participate in the prayer practice.142  The Court has yet to address 
the issue of lawmaker-led prayer, despite petitions of certiorari filed by the 
parties in Lund and Bormuth.143  The Court should take up the issue to 
properly clarify the role of tradition in legislative prayer cases and determine 
whether prayers led exclusively by lawmakers are consistent with the 
disestablishment principles of the First Amendment.144 
The Supreme Court should not issue a sweeping declaration that 
lawmaker-led prayer is permissible.  While legislative prayer, including 
                                                          
strays from the traditionally tolerated legislative prayer). 
 141. See Gregory, supra note 7 (noting that this case marks the third time the Court 
has taken a case regarding legislative prayer). 
 142. See Williamson v. Brevard Cty., No. 6:15-cv-1098-Orl-28DCI, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 163707, at *93-94 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2017) (holding the Brevard County prayer 
practice to be a violation of the First Amendment because the practice controls citizens’ 
opportunity to participate in the prayer practice based on his religious beliefs); Doe v. 
Pittsylvania Cty., 842 F.Supp.2d 906, 927 (W.D. Va. 2012) (denying the Board’s motion 
to dismiss and stating that the practice of opening meetings with Christian prayers runs 
afoul the First Amendment); see also Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F.Supp.2d 1103, 1104 
(S.D. Ind. 2005) (granting declaratory and injunctive relief to petitioners challenging the 
prayer practice of the Indiana General Assembly but maintaining that relief did not 
prevent opening House sessions with prayers so long as all official prayers remain 
inclusive and nonsectarian). 
 143. See Lund v. Rowan Cty., 138 S. Ct. 2564, 2564 (2018) (noting Justice Thomas’s 
and Justice Gorsuch’s dissent from the denial of certiorari); see also Bormuth v. Jackson 
Cty., 138 S. Ct. 2708, 2708 (2018) (indicating the Court denied the petition for writ of 
certiorari). 
 144. See Gregory, supra note 7 (quoting Professor Frank S. Ravitch, from Michigan 
State University, when stating that the Court may wait to take the case after watching 
what other circuits do in this area). 
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prayers led directly by lawmakers, is consistent with the tradition of this 
nation, allowing prayer practices that intentionally exclude minority 
religions or align governmental entities with any one religion defies the 
principles of the First Amendment by promoting one religion and 
condemning others.145  If the Supreme Court upholds lawmaker-led prayer, 
the Court should provide guidance that the prayer practice must not promote 
one religion by proselytizing or allocating burdens and benefits to citizens 
by virtue of one’s religious affiliation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although conflicting rulings by circuit courts during the same year on such 
parallel topics may indicate that one circuit got it wrong while the other 
circuit got it right, the fact-specific inquiry required in Establishment Clause 
cases proves that both the Fourth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit ruled correctly 
on the matter of legislator-led prayer.146  The prayer practice in Lund 
exemplified a pattern of proselytizing and preaching conversion whereas the 
petitioner in Bormuth failed to prove that the prayer practices of the County 
of Jackson Board of Commissioners were inconsistent with traditionally 
accepted practices.147  However, if the Sixth Circuit considered information 
that the pro se petitioner failed to properly place on the district court record, 
the court would have held the prayer practice of the County of Jackson Board 
of Commissioners unconstitutional due to the additional facts revealed to the 
court.148 
                                                          
 145. See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (explaining that the 
language of the Establishment Clause prevents more than the establishment of a formal 
state religion but also prohibits government action respecting the establishment of 
religion, such as the promotion of one religion over any others). 
 146. See generally Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1814 (2014) 
(establishing that challenges to legislative prayer requires a fact-sensitive inquiry to show 
the town leaders are not coercing the members of the public to engage in religious 
activities contrary to his own beliefs). 
 147. Compare Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 287 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(noting that the record clearly depicts that the content of the prayers suggested that 
Christianity was the one true faith), with Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 512-
13 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (explaining that while the prayers had a Christian tone, no 
evidence of attempts to proselytize or convert nonbelievers existed). 
 148. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 499-500 (noting the rule that state appellate courts do 
not have to accept facts even if the proffered evidence might show an outcome 
determinative issue of material fact). 
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